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While there has been much fanfare about the early outcomes 
of telecommunications reform in Fiji, Samoa and Vanuatu, 
less attention has been given to the regulatory challenges 
these countries encountered in the early stages of the reform 
programs. This study examined the role and effectiveness 
of independent regulators through comparative case study 
analyses of the three countries, based on insights drawn from 
semi-structured interviews with telecommunications officials, 
operators, regulators and users. It found that the early regulatory 
reforms in the Pacific showed evidence of ‘regulatory capture’ 
through legislative amendments and political influences on the 
operation of the office of the regulator. Further, the reliance of 
independent regulators on the national parliament’s budget 
appropriation and the lack of technical and financial resources 
imposed burdens on the independent regulators. On the other 
hand, the study found that the legal contractual agreement—the 
deed of settlement—signed between governments and the 
incumbent telecommunications operators and competition from 
new entrants provided immediate policy certainty to the reform 
process and catalysed the finalisation of the reform package.
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The recent telecommunications regulatory 
reforms in Samoa, Vanuatu and Fiji were 
driven predominantly by the political will 
of governments to deregulate their telecom-
munications markets and allow access to 
cheaper and better-quality telecommuni-
cations services. The entry of the private 
telecommunications operator Digicel Pacific 
Limited, however, intensified the commit-
ment to pro-competitive market reforms. 
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While there has been much fanfare about the 
early outcomes of the telecommunications 
reform processes in these Pacific island 
states, less attention has been given to the 
regulatory pitfalls and challenges the coun-
tries encountered in the early stages of their 
reform programs. This article contributes 
to the literature on regulatory reform by 
addressing one fundamental regulatory 
challenge: the process of negotiating the 
terms and conditions, including forms of 
compensation, for the premature termina-
tion of the exclusive rights of the incumbent 
monopolies.
This study examines this regulatory 
challenge based on one key proposition: 
that domestic policy restraints in the form 
of independent regulators are vulnerable to 
capture, thereby undermining the credibility 
of telecommunications reform processes.1 
The analyses of the process of ending 
monopoly rights from the case studies of 
Samoa, Vanuatu and Fiji provide crucial 
insights into the role and effectiveness of 
independent regulators during the reform 
process. The case studies provide evidence 
that the effectiveness of independent regula-
tors in providing policy credibility in the 
early stages of reform has been limited. The 
reasons are twofold. First, the independent 
regulators had limited technical capac-
ity and financial resources. Second, the 
independent regulators were vulnerable to 
political influence. On the other hand, the 
case studies of Vanuatu and Fiji give support 
to the crucial role of contractual agree-
ments—deeds of settlement2—in providing 
immediate credibility in the early stages of 
reform. The long-term viability of such legal 
mechanisms instead of development of a 
comprehensive and appropriate regulatory 
framework is, however, unclear.3
Section two of this article discusses the 
role of the independent regulators in Samoa, 
Vanuatu and Fiji. Section three examines 
the role of the independent regulator and 
the deed of settlement in the negotiations 
over breaking the exclusive rights of the 
incumbent operators. Section four examines 
the impact of independent regulators and 
the deed of settlement on the credibility of 
the telecommunications reforms. 
Independent regulators
Samoa
One of the fundamental components of 
Samoa’s telecommunication reforms was 
the implementation of comprehensive 
telecommunication legislation (the Telecom-
munications Act 2005) in June 2005. The new 
telecommunications legislation set out the 
key regulatory components of a competitive 
market—in particular, the establishment of 
a regulator’s office to oversee the regula-
tion of a competitive telecommunications 
sector.
The role of the regulator is defined in 
Part II, Sections 6–11 of the act. Section six 
of the act provides the right for the head 
of state, acting on the advice of cabinet, to 
appoint a regulator for a term of three years 
(with possible extension for a second term). 
Section seven provides for the ‘independ-
ence’ of potential candidates considered 
for the regulator’s position, who may not 
be involved in or have ‘proprietary inter-
est’ in a service provider, manufacturer or 
supplier of telecommunications equipment. 
Section eight outlines 22 responsibilities, 
functions and powers of the regulator. 
The regulator’s basic role is to: provide 
advice to the minister responsible for 
telecommunications on relevant policies; 
issue, amend or revoke licences; monitor 
and enforce compliance; regulate intercon-
nection agreements between operators; 
resolve disputes; and institute and maintain 
appropriate measures to prevent dominant 
operators from anti-competitive behaviour. 
Section nine provides the rights to establish 
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the office of the regulator. The regulator’s 
budget is appropriated from the govern-
ment’s national budgetary expenditure. 
The regulator is also required to ‘conduct 
its affairs’ and provide information to the 
general public in an open and transparent 
manner. Section 10 provides the authority 
for the regulator to propose a regulation to 
establish licence fees, radio spectrum usage 
fees and numbering fees. Section 11 provides 
for the rights of appeal and review of orders 
of the regulator.4 This section provides the 
right for operators to dispute directly to the 
Supreme Court any order made. An amend-
ment to the act in 2008, however, amended 
this clause by referring any dispute to a 
telecommunications tribunal rather than to 
the court system.
The regulator’s office was established 
in 2005 with seven officers. An interim 
regulator was appointed to act in the posi-
tion while a permanent appointment was 
sought. In 2008, another interim regulator 
was appointed. On 16 February 2009, a 
permanent regulator was appointed. Four 
professionals and three administrative 
staff run the Office of the Regulator. A legal 
analyst and three technical officers operate 
under the direction of the regulator. The 
office’s fund for the financial year 2008/09 
was T1,402,230 (approximately US$526,000), 
of which 54 per cent was for wages (Legisla-
tive Assembly of Samoa 2009).
Fiji
As enacted by promulgation in 2008, regula-
tion of the telecommunications sector in 
Fiji is shared in principle by two independ-
ent statutory authorities: the Commerce 
Commission and the Telecommunications 
Authority of Fiji (TAF). The Commerce 
Commission, established under the Com-
merce Act 1998, is the independent statutory 
authority regulating competition and price-
control policies on monopolies. Section 11 
of the act states that the ‘[c]ommission is 
not subject to the control or direction of the 
Minister or to any referring authority in the 
performance of its functions’. This provision 
arguably provides for the independence of 
the Commerce Commission from ministerial 
or governmental interference. The commis-
sion consists of three and not more than 
five commissioners with a chairperson, all 
appointed by the minister. The commission’s 
budget is appropriated by parliament. The 
minister reserves the right to remove from 
office any member of the commission for 
misbehaviour, incompetence or incapacity.
TAF was created by the Telecommu-
nications Promulgation 2008, approved in 
January 2008 by the military government. 
The 2008 promulgation aimed to provide a 
regulatory framework for telecommunica-
tions, promoting fair competition, consumer 
protection and efficient investment meas-
ures. TAF is to be responsible for licensing 
arrangements, spectrum management, the 
telecommunications numbering system, 
universal services and a Telecommunica-
tions Appeal Tribunal. Division 2, Section 4 
of the promulgation gives legal rights to the 
independence of TAF, stating that members 
are to be ‘independent and impartial in the 
exercise of their functions and represent the 
public interest’. The minister has the right 
to remove any member on the grounds of 
misconduct, conflict of interest, inefficiency, 
fraud or dishonesty or incapacity to perform 
duties. The funding of TAF is to be appropri-
ated by parliament.
As of December 2009, TAF is not 
operational. Once operational, however, the 
two authorities should complement each 
other, with competition and pricing policies 
regulated by the Commerce Commission 
and licensing, spectrum management, 
numbering and universal service to be 
handled by TAF.
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Vanuatu
The Office of the Regulator was established 
by an amendment (Telecommunications 
Amendment Act No. 15 of 2007) to the Tel-
ecommunications Act 1989. The amendment 
grants two fundamental powers to the 
minister to regulate (or delegate to appro-
priate people the power to regulate) the 
telecommunications sector and the power to 
make determinations over disputes relating 
to interconnection between operators. An 
interim regulator was appointed in Febru-
ary 2008 for 12 months and the Office of the 
Regulator was staffed with two permanent 
and two part-time technical staff.
The regulator’s responsibilities are not 
reflected in the Telecommunications Act 1989 
(and subsequent amendments), but rather 
are dictated by three fundamental, legally 
binding documents. First, the regulator’s 
employment contract outlines key respon-
sibilities and other duties delegated by the 
Minister for Infrastructure and Public Utili-
ties. Second, the ‘deed of settlement’, which 
ended the exclusive state monopoly and was 
signed by operators and the government, 
outlined the regulator’s role on monitor-
ing licensing, spectrum management, 
the numbering system, interconnections 
agreements and mediation in the case of 
disputes. Third, the new licences granted to 
Telecom Vanuatu Limited (TVL) and Digicel 
also reflect specific rights and powers of the 
regulator.
A new Telecommunications and Radio-
communications Regulations Bill (2009) 
which effectively consolidates the key 
responsibilities of the regulator is being 
circulated for public consultation. Other 
telecommunications regulatory aspects such 
as universal service funds, anti-competitive 
behaviour, spectrum management, intercon-
nection agreements and the numbering 
system are not addressed in the current 
Telecommunications Act 1989 (and subse-
quent amendments). These key regulatory 
principles are addressed in the draft bill. 
A regulatory official in Port Vila explained 
that 
we are operating under the Telecom-
munications Act 1989 (as amended). The 
government is planning to introduce a 
new Telecommunications Bill, which 
will include several changes. Since 
it was drafted 17 months ago [2007], 
the government has already made a 
number of changes to its policies. For 
example, in the settlement agreement 
and licences for TVL and Digicel, 
there are certain provisions that are in 
conflict with the bill, so that needs to 
be harmonised. It is a bit odd making 
the laws consistent with the licence 
rather than the licence consistent with 
the laws. The consumer protection and 
anti-competitive measures have been 
written into the licences instead of the 
law. So that is the environment that 
we are operating from at the moment 
[up to September 2009]. (Respondent 
six, fieldwork interviews, 11 August 
2008)
The regulator’s office in Vanuatu relies 
heavily on donor funding, while in Samoa 
and Fiji, the offices are funded by the govern-
ment. Samoa and Fiji have enacted modern, 
comprehensive telecommunications leg-
islation, including the responsibilities of 
independent regulators. The independence 
of all three regulators is designated by law 
or by contractual arrangement.
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Breaking exclusive rights on 
telecommunications: the roles of 
independent regulators and the 
deed of settlement
This section discusses early policy moti-
vation in terminating exclusive state 
monopolies in the three countries, the role 
of the independent regulator throughout 
these processes and the terms of the deeds 
of settlement. 
Samoa: the independent regulator and 
the interconnection dispute
Three mobile service operators won licences 
to operate in Samoa after the public bidding 
for mobile services in early 2006: Digicel, 
SamoaTel and TSL. Digicel was granted a 
licence in April 2006 but, through a business 
move, it acquired 90 per cent ownership of 
TSL, effectively inheriting TSL’s licence and 
entitlements.5 The mobile sector was set 
for competition when Digicel launched in 
November 2006 and SamoaTel’s ‘GoMobile’ 
launched two months later. One of the 
contentious issues for the two operators 
was establishing an interconnection agree-
ment.6
Preliminary discussions between the 
two operators were not fruitful. In October 
2006, the two operators informed the 
interim regulator that they were unable to 
reach an agreement on interconnection rates 
and requested that the interim regulator set 
interim interconnection charges. The interim 
regulator issued interim interconnection 
rates for fixed and mobile services effective 
from 31 October 2006.
The interim interconnection rate was 
imposed for four months and two weeks. 
During that time, the two operators were 
required to undertake individual, cost-based 
interconnection studies to be submitted by 
March 2007.7 During the interconnection 
dispute, the general counsel for Digicel 
explained that ‘cost based’ ‘implies that 
the interconnection charges of a dominant 
provider8 shall be based on their costs of 
providing interconnection services and 
shall be economically viable’ (Supreme 
Court of Samoa 2008:3). A UK consulting 
firm (Intercai Mondiale Limited, IML) was 
contracted by the Government of Samoa to 
assist the interim regulator in determining 
interconnection rates.
The operators might, however, have 
ignored the interim interconnection rates 
order (2006/4). An Education, Science, Com-
munication and Information Technology 
Committee review into the interconnection 
rates of the two operators on 1 March 2007 
noted some inconsistencies between the 
tender prices and the real mobile rates. One 
of the committee’s findings noted ‘concern 
with the increase in cell phone charges per 
minute by Digicel and SamoaTel. They 
both are not complying with amounts they 
tendered for when they applied for a licence 
to provide cell phone services’ (Lesa 2007:4). 
As reported in the Samoa Observer (11 
July 2007), the chairman of the committee 
and opposition MP, Levaopolo Talatonu, 
‘accused both companies of misleading the 
Tenders Board by submitting tender rates 
cheaper than what they currently charge’. 
The chairman was also reported as saying 
that ‘the licences granted to these companies 
were given because of the rates they submit-
ted. We all know that both companies are 
charging rates far off the mark’ (Lesa 2007:1). 
No action was recorded as being taken by 
the interim regulator in relation to these 
price discrepancies.
The interim regulator, Digicel and 
SamoaTel communicated frequently during 
November and December 2006 on the 
details of the cost model. The regulator 
collected information from both parties 
through submission of comments on the 
regulator’s cost-based modelling proposals 
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and the operators’ modelling. The regula-
tor issued a cost study outline, Samoan 
Guidelines, on 11 January 2007, prescribing 
the key ingredients of the cost studies that 
each operator should address.
Having in mind the deadline for the 
cost studies of 11 March 2007, the regulator 
consistently pressured the two operators 
to submit their cost studies. SamoaTel 
submitted its cost model on 19 March 2007 
and a revised version on 22 March 2007. 
Digicel submitted on 27 March 2007. IML 
required further ‘supporting documents’ 
from Digicel’s cost study. The regulator, 
however, was not satisfied with the sup-
porting documents.
The interim regulator instructed IML to 
construct its own model of Digicel’s costs, 
based on a different model from the one in 
the Samoan Guidelines. On 15 May 2007, the 
final report with recommended intercon-
nection rates was submitted by IML to the 
regulator and on 16 May 2007, the regulator 
sent the new interconnection rates to both 
operators. Digicel was not happy with the 
new rates. 
In the light of potential revenue loss for 
Digicel, it sought an appeal in the Supreme 
Court against the interim regulator’s order. 
The main argument used was the failure of 
the interim regulator to accord procedural 
fairness to Digicel when conducting the 
process of establishing the interconnection 
rates. The Supreme Court’s judgment was 
announced on 30 March 2008. The Supreme 
Court ruled that Digicel’s appeal against 
the regulator’s interconnection order was 
allowed and the order was declared unlaw-
ful. The cost of the litigation imposed on 
the regulator and subsequently paid by 
the government was quoted as T1 million 
(about US$385,000). An agreement between 
the regulator and the two operators to revert 
to the interim interconnection rates (2006/4) 
was reached, with the two operators to make 
further submissions to the regulator. By 
September 2008, the regulator approved a 
new interim interconnection charge.
The outcome of the interconnection 
dispute favoured Digicel, although the 
regulator’s intention was to ensure prompt 
decisions on interconnection rates in the 
public interest. The urgency by the regula-
tor could, however, have been the result 
of pressure from a third party. Overall, the 
interconnection dispute reflected the limited 
technical capacity of the regulator’s office 
and its inexperience in handling disputes 
of this nature.
Vanuatu: the independent regulator and 
the deed of settlement
Pre-competition regulatory framework. 
One year before Vanuatu’s independence 
in 1980, VANITEL was established as a 
private operator delivering international 
telecommunications services, while the 
government-owned Vanuatu Post & Tel-
ecommunications provided the domestic 
services.9 When developing countries 
in the 1980s and 1990s reformed their 
telecommunications sectors by way of 
privatisation, Vanuatu adopted similar 
policy directions. In 1992, Vanuatu adopted 
a privatisation program for telecommunica-
tions, whereby VANITEL and Vanuatu Post 
& Telecommunications merged and formed 
an incorporated company, Telecom Vanuatu 
Limited (TVL). TVL was granted exclusivity 
to provide all telecommunications services. 
A 20-year franchise agreement was signed, 
with the government, Cable & Wireless 
and France Telecom having equal shares. 
TVL initially established its infrastructure 
network in the main towns. Copper wire 
(fixed lines) was the primary communica-
tion channel and cross-subsidisation of the 
main urban area network enabled limited 
expansion to rural areas. A telecommunica-
tions official in Vanuatu stated that ‘the main 
aspect of the agreement was the exclusivity 
allowing TVL to run on a commercial basis 
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and make profit out of Port Vila, Lugan-
ville…the main towns, and cross-subsidise 
the rural areas’ (Respondent 25, fieldwork 
interviews, 20 August 2008). TVL, however, 
soon encountered challenges that hindered 
its rural development program. The same 
telecommunications official in Port Vila 
stated that ‘in the last two years [2006–07], 
the government has changed direction. They 
decided that it is about time to introduce 
competition. There are number of reasons 
for that but most noticeable were pricing 
and rural coverage’ (Respondent 25, field-
work interviews, 20 August 2008). 
Breaking exclusivity rights—nego-
tiations versus court settlement? Public 
pressure to reform the sector grew over 
time. Three incidents deserve further dis-
cussion. First, when Vanuatu withdrew its 
World Trade Organization (WTO) accession 
package in 2001, several reasons—mainly 
political—were cited (Gay 2005). One of 
the fundamental issues, however, was the 
issue of committing the telecommunications 
sector in Vanuatu’s services offer (’Ofa 2008). 
Grynberg and Joy (2000:171), discussing 
Vanuatu’s terms of WTO accession, write 
that ‘the United States has added a further 
demand for the opening of the telecom-
munications sector. In Vanuatu this is not 
legally possible as with the condominium 
arrangement France has an ironclad “gate-
way monopoly” until 2012.’ The Vanuatu 
government at the time considered the cost 
of opting out extremely high, although the 
policy direction was towards liberalising 
the sector.
Second, the ‘ironclad gateway monop-
oly’ was legally tested between October 2005 
and September 2006 when the government 
granted a private company (Pacific Data 
Solution, PDS) a telecommunications licence 
to operate an electronic-gambling service to 
a closed-network client (Supreme Court of 
the Republic of Vanuatu 2006). The incum-
bent monopolist, TVL, legally challenged 
the government’s decision to grant a licence 
on the basis that the franchise agreement 
granted exclusive rights to TVL to operate 
all telecommunications services in Vanuatu. 
The court ruled otherwise, however, stating 
that the government’s decision was legal 
since the licence given to PDS was to a 
restricted e-gambling network rather than 
the general public. A government official 
in Port Vila stated that ‘at that time and 
through that process of the initial decision 
and the appeal, the question of the whole 
future of the Telecommunications sector 
came to a head’ (Respondent 22, fieldwork 
interviews, 14 August 2008).
The third and probably most crucial 
incident was the government’s 2006 infor-
mation and communications technology 
policy paper and the amendments to the 
Telecommunications Act 1989. Through its 
policy paper, the government signalled its 
intention to liberalise the market. A govern-
ment official in Port Vila recalled that ‘the 
policy paper was discussed in Parliament. 
When we were involved with the court case, 
revision was undertaken to the Telecommuni-
cations Act 1989 to allow granting of licences 
to new operators’ (Respondent 26, fieldwork 
interviews, 20 August 2008).
Part 3, Section 16(6) of the Telecommuni-
cations Act 1989 states that the minister has 
the right to grant a licence for the provision 
of public domestic and public international 
telecommunications services ‘provided that 
at one time in Vanuatu there shall be no 
more than one telecommunications system 
in operation to provide public international 
telecommunication service and no more 
than one telecommunication system in 
operation for the public national telecom-
munication service’. Condition 2.1 (Supreme 
Court of the Republic of Vanuatu 2006) of 
the franchise agreement between the Gov-
ernment of Vanuatu and TVL stated that 
subject to the terms and conditions 
of this licence, the Minister hereby 
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grants to the Company [TVL] the 
sole rights…to provide, operate and 
develop, and the Company shall 
provide, operate and develop, the 
Public Telecommunication System of 
Vanuatu and further to be the exclusive 
provider of Public Telecommunication 
Services in Vanuatu. 
It was apparent that to end prematurely 
the exclusive rights enjoyed by TVL, all 
stakeholders had to negotiate the terms of 
the franchise agreement that legally bound 
the government, Cable & Wireless and 
France Telecom. Negotiating to end the 
franchise agreement, however, as indicated 
earlier by the experience of Vanuatu’s 2001 
WTO accession package, was extremely 
costly for the government. A government 
official in Port Vila stated that ‘the prevail-
ing wisdom was that TVL’s monopoly was 
contractually solid. It was thought that 
because of the franchise agreement, there 
was absolutely nothing the country could 
do to liberalise telecommunications unless 
with the consent of TVL (Respondent 22, 
fieldwork interviews, 14 August 2008). 
Further, TVL initially requested 
monetary compensation for any loss of 
exclusivity. The limited public funds to 
pay compensation could have compelled 
the government to pursue negotiation of a 
deed of settlement. It might not, however, 
have been the only stakeholder to favour 
such an option. The two other stakeholders, 
Cable & Wireless and France Telecom, could 
have incurred costs if they had attempted 
to protect their exclusivity through the 
courts. The franchise agreement was not 
as ‘ironclad’ as previously thought. A 2000 
Privy Council decision from Dominica’s 
Court of Appeal, known as the ‘Marpin 
decision’ (Court of Appeal 2000), ruled that 
an exclusive telecommunications monopoly 
held by Cable & Wireless Dominica Limited 
infringed on Dominica’s freedom of speech 
as guaranteed by Dominica’s constitution. 
A similar defence was arguably possible for 
the Vanuatu government to exploit if it had 
to go through the court system. 
Fiji: the Radisson accord
Pre-competition regulatory framework: 
2005 road map. The move for comprehensive 
regulatory reform in the telecommunica-
tions sector was a long-term policy direction 
tracing back to 2003. A World Bank mission 
in 2003 and a case study of Fiji’s telecom-
munications sector by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) in 2004 
indicated that the major impediment to 
the telecommunications sector’s perform-
ance was exclusive rights (Fiji Ministry of 
Information, Communications and Media 
Relations 2005:7). The Laisenia Qarase 
government’s Minister for Information, 
Communications and Media Relations, 
Marieta Rigamoto, in a workshop in Suva 
on the ‘Road Map for Telecommunications 
Sector Reform’ in December 2005 acknowl-
edged that 
several analyses indicate that the 
current sector structure and rigid 
licensing regime, with technological 
restrictions—operators with exclusivity 
in particular market segments such 
as domestic fixed, international fixed, 
mobile, and internet—have hampered 
service provision. The rigid structures 
impede beneficial use of emerging and 
quickly changing technologies, and 
do not take account of convergence 
between telecommunications, internet 
and media. (Ministry of Information, 
Communications and Media Relations 
2005:2–3)
The 2005 Road Map for Telecommunica-
tions Sector Reform outlined the updating 
of the 1998 telecommunications policy,10 
the establishment of TAF and the ending 
of exclusive licences. The plan for ending 
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exclusive rights in the telecommunications 
market encountered two regulatory chal-
lenges. The market in Fiji was artificially 
dissected in that each key subsector held 
exclusivity rights: FINTEL held inter-
national services, Vodafone held mobile 
services and TFL held domestic services. 
Any deregulation plan would therefore 
involve three sets of negotiations for the 
three operators, rather than one.
A legal dispute ignited in December 
2005 between the government and Voda-
fone, based on the road map’s direction for 
the government to grant mobile licences 
to potential new competitors (High Court 
of Fiji 2005). Vodafone challenged these 
plans based on the argument that it had 
inherited (sub-leased) the exclusive mobile 
licences from its parent company, TFL. 
The High Court acknowledged that the 
granting of exclusive mobile rights by TFL 
to Vodafone had been consented to by the 
government, which provided a strong basis 
for Vodafone’s argument. The High Court 
was, however, unsure about the legality of 
the inherited exclusive rights as the Telecom-
munications Act 1989 authorised only the 
minister to grant licences. Similar to the 
Vanuatu negotiations, the Fijian government 
used the Marpin case in Dominica (though 
it was not exploited to its full potential) 
in the attempt to justify its deregulation 
road map. The High Court’s decision of 20 
December 2005 and also the Court of Appeal 
decision (Court of Appeal Fiji Islands 2006) 
dated 28 July 2006 both granted decisions 
favouring Vodafone maintaining its exclu-
sive licence.
Deed of settlement: Radisson accord. 
The coup d’état led by Commodore Baini-
marama in December 2006 catalysed the 
progress of the reform. Digicel had expressed 
interest in entering the market. Digicel had 
been talking with the ousted Qarase govern-
ment. The interim government reopened a 
tender process for expressions of interest in 
the mobile service sector. The interim gov-
ernment, together with the exclusive rights 
holders of telecommunications services, 
arranged for a conference to negotiate the 
details of deregulation. The series of meet-
ings between the stakeholders was held at 
the Radisson Fiji Resort in Nadi. 
The interim government was in no posi-
tion to grant monetary compensation for 
prematurely ending the monopoly rights, 
and hence chose to pursue the negotia-
tions path. The complexity of the market 
structure meant that a negotiated resolution 
was going to be difficult to achieve. The 
deed of settlement was a complex set of 
arrangements for the ending of exclusivity 
for the incumbent holders in return for short 
transitional periods. Vodafone Fiji Limited’s 
exclusive licence for mobile service was to 
end by 30 September 2008 (about a nine-
month transitional period). Vodafone Fiji 
Limited in return was to receive a 15–year 
open licence to operate in any of the sectors 
(subject to the transitional periods granted 
to FINTEL and TFL). TFL also received 
a 15–year open licence but would not be 
allowed to operate in the mobile service 
sector ‘as long it has direct economic inter-
ests in Vodafone Fiji Ltd’ (Baselala n.d.) in 
order to avoid potential abuse of market 
dominance. TFL was allowed to establish 
its own international gateway, subject to 
an 18-month transitional period granted 
to FINTEL, which ended in July 2009. 
FINTEL also received an open licence and 
was allowed to operate in all sectors. The 
new entrant, Digicel, was granted an open 
licence to operate in the mobile service 
sector from October 2008 onwards, subject 
to the transitional period restrictions offered 
to the incumbents.
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Overall, the ‘Radisson accord’ achieved 
its first objective, which was to end monop-
oly rights in the telecommunications market. 
The Radisson accord is crucial as it sets forth 
the legal arrangements and responsibilities 
for all operators and stakeholders in the 
market for the next 15 years. The 15-year 
licence, coupled with other telecommuni-
cations principles outlined in the deed of 
settlement, provided some certainty to the 
telecommunications sector.
The next section discusses the impact 
of independent regulators and deeds of 
settlement on the credibility of telecom-
munications regulatory reforms in Samoa, 
Vanuatu and Fiji. 
Credibility of telecommunications 
reforms: the impact of 
independent regulators and deeds 
of settlement
Samoa: the independent regulator
The outcome of the dispute did not go down 
well with the government. A government 
official in Apia hesitantly commented that 
‘although we did not get the outcome from 
that case we [wanted]…the regulator acted 
independently and tried his best in resolving 
the differences between the two operators’ 
(Respondent 14, fieldwork interviews, 22 
July 2008). The T1 million court cost was a 
major blow but the fact that a private foreign 
company took a statutory arm of government 
to court and won convincingly created some 
bitterness. A regulatory official in Apia com-
mented that ‘the question of the case…was one 
of procedure and also I think one of transpar-
ency…the government has every right to 
be shaken up because it is not just Digicel 
that can take them to court but any entity or 
player within the sector’ (Respondent seven, 
fieldwork interviews, 15 July 2008).
The prospect of potential future liti-
gation against the regulator, indirectly 
affecting the government, could have forced 
some consideration of key provisions in the 
legislation. Amending the telecommunica-
tions legislation, however, might not be 
an appropriate solution to the problem. A 
regulatory official explained that
even if you try to put all these 
regulatory policies—establish an 
independent regulator, set up a 
universal fund, competition policy, 
an interconnection agreement, and 
so on—in place before the market 
is liberalised, it is only when the 
market starts to operate that you 
observe how operators react to the 
policy framework put in place [and] 
that you understand how the sector 
is developing. The principle may be 
sound but the application of how 
they are actually designed to work 
may not yield the outcome that was 
originally envisaged. (Respondent 
eight, fieldwork interviews, 15 July 
2008)
Parliament passed an amendment to the 
Telecommunications Act 2005 in June 2008. 
The 2008 amendment influences the act in 
four fundamental ways. First, an appeal 
to the order of the regulator ‘may only be 
made to a Telecommunications Tribunal’. 
The original section 11 says that an appeal 
from an order of the regulator may be made 
only to the Supreme Court. A Telecom-
munications Tribunal was also to be set up, 
with a judge or lawyer, to be appointed by 
the Chief Justice, and two other members. 
Second, the government was to be exempted 
from the payment of any costs associated 
with any tribunal proceedings. Third, the 
decision of the tribunal is final and binding 
on all parties. Further, any appeal of the 
tribunal’s decision may not be filed in any 
court. Fourth, the regulator’s discretion 
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in determining interim interconnection 
charges was further refined to grant more 
powers to the regulator to determine and 
impose interim interconnection rates on 
operators in the case of operators failing 
to reach an agreement on interconnection 
within two weeks.
The outcome of the interconnection 
dispute highlights three fundamental issues: 
first, the susceptibility of policymakers to 
make changes in policies and legislation 
in order to avoid future litigation costs. 
Second, the dispute highlighted weaknesses 
in the process of setting up and imple-
menting the regulatory framework in the 
appropriate sequence. Third, the capacity of 
the regulator’s office to deal with complex 
issues such as determining interconnection 
rates, spectrum management, numbering 
systems, setting up competition policies and 
articulating and justifying the regulator’s 
position during negotiations with operators 
is crucial. A telecommunications official 
stated that ‘to regulate the telecommunica-
tions sector in Samoa, you need a person 
with great breadth of skills and it is very 
difficult to find anyone who is willing to 
come and live in Samoa and do that work’ 
(Respondent 16, fieldwork interviews, 23 
July 2008). 
Overall, the case of Samoa shows that 
regulatory policies have been changed such 
that they could hamper a private investor’s 
ability to seek legal justice. Further, there is 
evidence that the strong political will of the 
government to move swiftly towards a lib-
eralised market could have come at the cost 
of the independent regulator’s office lacking 
technical experience and financial resources. 
The resulting uncertainties could lead to 
more frequent disputes and litigation.
Vanuatu: the independent regulator and 
the deed of settlement
The World Bank facilitated the negotiations 
over the deed of settlement in Vanuatu. The 
negotiations took more than 12 months 
(2006–07). The deed of settlement covered 
six fundamental issues. First, it was required 
that TVL forgo the remainder of the term 
of its protected licence (2008–12). In return, 
the government agreed to transfer its shares 
(33.33 per cent) equally between Cable & 
Wireless and France Telecom and establish 
TVL as a private company with 50–50 
partnership. Third, the deed of settlement 
provided for the establishment of a regula-
tor. Fourth, a universal service fund was to 
be established from the contributions of all 
operators, based on a percentage of their 
annual revenues. Fifth, certain commercial 
concessions would be made available to all 
operators—for instance, import duties were 
to be exempted on all capital goods imports. 
Sixth, an interconnection agreement was to 
be established before operations began.
Four issues in the deed of settlement 
require further discussion. First, both 
telecommunications operators, particularly 
the incumbent, were keen on establishing a 
regulator. A telecommunications operator 
in Port Vila explained that ‘we negotiated 
aggressively with the government to ensure 
the establishment of a full independent reg-
ulator. We wanted a very good referee and a 
level playing field. Without that, TVL would 
not have given up its exclusivity rights’ 
(Respondent 25, fieldwork interviews, 20 
August 2008). TVL saw the establishment of 
a regulator’s office as ‘protection’ for them. 
A regulatory official explained that ‘TVL 
wanted to see a regulatory framework in 
place, based on fair trading practices. It is 
unusual for a monopoly to seek that kind of 
protection, because normally the monopoly 
is the player that can abuse its dominant 
market position’ (Respondent 19, fieldwork 
interviews, 11 August 2008).
According to respondents, the new 
competitor also valued the establishment 
of an independent regulator. The interim 
regulator has been effective in areas such 
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as building the office’s technical capac-
ity (two local, part-time employees with 
technical expertise in radio licensing and 
radio spectrum have been recruited). A web 
site (http://www.telecomregulator.gov.vu) 
for the telecommunications regulator has 
been established, providing crucial public 
information about government policies and 
the regulator’s decisions. The office has also 
been effective in providing mediation in 
negotiations between the incumbent and 
the new entrant. 
Second, the government drew up 
an interconnection agreement between 
operators for the operators td sign before 
any licence was granted. Normally, the 
interconnection agreement is negotiated 
between operators after licences have been 
granted and is usually a point of dispute 
between the dominant market player and 
the new entrant. The government’s initia-
tive in drawing up its own interconnection 
agreement does appear to have minimised 
disputes between operators. A regulatory 
official best captured the dynamics of the 
government’s intentions
The government did something that 
was quite smart in the process of setting up 
the licence and the settlement agreement…
The government offered the interconnection 
agreement to TVL and Digicel as part of 
their commitments in the deed of settlement. 
Since government compensated TVL by 
giving up its shares, it asked TVL to be will-
ing to sign the interconnection agreement. 
Similarly with Digicel, it wanted a licence…
and so government was very careful not to 
grant Digicel a licence until they also agreed 
to sign this interconnection agreement. 
There was never a negotiation between TVL 
and Digicel on the interconnection agree-
ment. (Respondent 19, fieldwork interviews, 
11 August 2008)
The pre-setting of an interconnection 
agreement as part of the deed of settlement 
was one of the regulatory policy successes 
in the Vanuatu reform. It provided certainty 
to the market by ensuring that both licensees 
were aware of the interconnection tariffs to 
be used.
There was opposition to the govern-
ment’s decision to divide its TVL shares 
equally between Cable & Wireless and 
France Telecom. As reported by the Vanuatu 
Daily Post (2 April 2008), ‘the decision to 
give away VT1 billion shares in TVL was 
bad business. The opposition questioned 
the sort of agreement negotiated with TVL 
for the acquisition of government interest. 
They also said that the divesting of state 
assets in highly profitable entities for noth-
ing or negligible benefit is without doubt 
bad business.’
Perhaps crucial to the government’s 
general revenue was the immediate loss of 
revenue from its shares in TVL. A govern-
ment official explained that 
the government seriously considered 
the implication of revenue loss from 
forgoing the shares. However, when 
we did our analyses, the government 
found that we will actually be earning 
more due to the two telecommunication 
operators’ payment of value-added 
tax. The licence alone would generate 
roughly V50 million. The Deputy 
Prime Minister [now Prime Minister] 
presented the bill and everyone 
supported it, even the opposition. 
(Respondent 26, fieldwork interviews, 
20 August 2008)
A closer look at the government’s TVL 
dividend payments, however, shows a dif-
ferent story. From 2000 to 2006, TVL paid 
the government an average of V48 million 
annually. The highest dividend recorded 
was in 2006: V103 million. The average and 
the highest-ever dividend amounts were 
nowhere close to the V1 billion claimed. 
Further, in comparison with the govern-
ment’s revenue in the period 2000–06, the 
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also provided assistance with mediation 
to get the parties talking. Currently, they 
are developing regulatory capacity and 
will be providing a longer-term program 
of support. It was constructive donor col-
laboration.
Overall, the negotiations that led to the 
deed of settlement for ending the monopoly 
rights of TVL were the vital instruments 
in providing certainty to the regulatory 
reform process. As of September 2009, 
the comprehensive telecommunications 
bill that encompasses the key regulatory 
principles for an independent regulator 
has not been enacted, yet these principles 
are legally incorporated in the contractual 
arrangements. This unprecedented regula-
tory move could be well justified, as it has 
allowed instant and ample flexibility for the 
operators and the government to terminate 
exclusivity and allow competition to flour-
ish without prolonged political debate. The 
regulatory vacuum, however, could pose 
institutional uncertainty in the long term 
when market operators play in a market 
that is based largely on contractual rather 
than a mainstream regulatory policy frame-
work. Further, the problem of supply-side 
constraints—particularly technical expertise 
and the financial means of the government 
to establish and maintain an independent 
regulatory body—should be flagged. The 
effectiveness of the independent regulator 
depends on the capacity of the office to 
undertake in-depth economic analyses and 
modelling of price and cost structures of 
operators and its ability to validate price 
structures and coverage. The financial and 
technical assistance provided by donors 
facilitated this process, but its long-term 
sustainability could be in question.
average revenue contribution by TVL’s 
dividend was 1 per cent of the total annual 
government revenue.
Further, several stakeholders within the 
government thought that signing a cashless 
deal was a well-negotiated deal. A govern-
ment official recalled that
returning the shares was the price 
of escaping the monopoly, which 
was disadvantageous to consumers 
and massively restrictive of national 
development. So some might think it 
is a very small price to pay. There has 
been some adverse political comment 
about the terms of the settlement. In 
my respectful opinion, those political 
comments were uninformed. It has 
to be pointed out that initially, TVL 
sought monetary compensation for 
any deregulation of the industry. So 
to have signed a deal that does not 
involve any payment by government 
might be thought to have been well 
negotiated. (Respondent 22, fieldwork 
interviews, 14 August 2008)
The minister responsible for telecom-
munications, Edward Natapei, also played 
a crucial role in the reform program. A 
regulatory official said that Natapei ‘is 
the champion of the telecommunications 
reform in Vanuatu. I don’t think that it was 
widely held in government that telecom-
munications reform was [necessarily the] 
right path to go [down] but he held [the] 
necessary power and commitment to bring 
it through’ (Respondent 19, fieldwork 
interviews, 11 August 2008). 
Fourth, the World Bank and AusAID 
were instrumental in the reform process. The 
Vanuatu government had limited technical 
capacity in telecommunications. AusAID 
provided valuable assistance in funding 
legal expertise and capacity building. The 
World Bank provided strategic advice on 
how to approach the reform process. It 
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the price review processes. Furthermore, 
anecdotal evidence from the fieldwork 
and the regulatory policies implemented 
suggests that political influence hampered 
the independence of the regulatory entity. 
For example, whether intentional or not, the 
Telecommunications Promulgation of 2008 
did not have one fundamental component: 
the establishment of an independent regula-
tory body, TAF. The reasons for the delay 
were based on administrative and logistical 
challenges. Perhaps the slow progress is 
understandable as the powers granted to the 
independent regulator under the promulga-
tion are significant—in particular, the power 
to grant telecommunications licences, 
which was previously held by the minister 
responsible for telecommunications.
Further, in the period 2008–09, the Com-
merce Commission encountered internal 
controversies, including the chairman’s 
contract being prematurely terminated by 
the government. The chairman had been the 
interim government’s lead representative in 
the negotiation of the Radisson accord. 
The interim government’s heavy influ-
ence on the regulatory body is no surprise 
since the regulatory body is heavily reliant 
on public funding. The Commerce Commis-
sion was temporarily closed in September 
2008. The Fiji Times Online (Singh 2008) 
reported that the Commerce Commission 
had ‘closed down because it does not have 
funds to pay its staff’. It was reported that 
the commission contacted the Permanent 
Secretary for Industry, Tourism, Trade and 
Communications and later the Ministry 
of Finance but was told that ‘the commis-
sion needed to have a further audit’. The 
chairman of the commission was reported 
as saying that ‘the Commission has been 
audited by the Audit Office. Using audit 
process as a means of intimidation of an 
independent statutory body is unaccept-
able’ (Singh 2008:1). The heavy reliance on 
Fiji: the independent regulator and the 
deed of settlement
As mentioned earlier, TAF is not yet 
operational and the Commerce Commission 
continues to provide a majority of the regu-
latory functions in the telecommunications 
sector. The effectiveness of the Commerce 
Commission during and after the telecom-
munications reform has been mixed. One 
of the early contributions by the Commerce 
Commission in the move to deregulate 
the telecommunications market was the 
determination of prices of telecommunica-
tions services across the sector in 2005. A 
regulatory official in Suva recalled that
over the years, the operators were 
never regulated [on prices]; no-
one determined the prices for their 
services. There were a lot of complaints 
from foreign investors who wanted to 
come in [but could not], because the 
cost of establishing a business was 
very high and telecommunications 
[costs] contributed significantly to 
that high cost. So that triggered the 
commission to look at the prices of 
telecommunications charges across 
the sector and to some extent [it] 
did manage to reduce the prices 
of telecommunications overall. 
(Respondent 31, fieldwork interviews, 
20 November 2008) 
A further price review was undertaken 
in 2008, resulting in a further reduction in 
prices.
These reviews, however, raised two 
fundamental challenges for the commission. 
First, the financial information made avail-
able to the commission by the incumbents 
on which to base its price determinations 
was limited. Second, the commission did 
not have the technical capacity to deal 
with the complex exclusivity arrange-
ments of the three monopoly operators in 
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Conclusions
The case studies shed light on four important 
issues in the early phases of telecommunica-
tions reform. First, although it is generally 
recognised that the role of an independent 
regulator provides some certainty to the 
reform process, its effectiveness can be 
hampered by lack of technical and financial 
capacity and political influences (as in Fiji 
and Samoa). Samoa and Vanuatu initially 
set up an interim regulator staffed by for-
eign experts. Vanuatu’s regulator relies 
predominantly on the long-term financing 
of international donors for its sustainability. 
All three offices rely to a great extent on 
budgets appropriated by parliament. Fur-
ther, the cases of Fiji and, to some extent, 
Samoa show evidence of an independent 
regulator’s susceptibility to ‘capture’. Given 
the lack of technical and financial capacity 
therefore, coupled with susceptibility to 
regulatory capture, the role of independent 
regulators in providing reform credibility 
is limited. 
Second, donor agencies and regional 
and international institutions played impor-
tant roles in facilitating the reform process 
through providing technical expertise and 
funding. Through the sharing of infor-
mation between development agencies, 
regulatory lessons from each country have 
been shared, which will also benefit future 
reform programs. This is clear from the 
interconnection dispute in Samoa (which 
was the first country to reform, with World 
Bank/AusAID involvement), which has 
provided regulatory lessons for the other 
countries. The establishment of the inter-
connection agreement by the Government 
of Vanuatu before the granting of licences, 
as part of the deed of settlement, avoided 
the interconnection disputes that Samoa 
initially encountered. The global private 
telecommunications operator Digicel 
could also be sharing its local information 
public funding was solved to some extent 
when an amendment to the Commerce Act 
1998, known as the Commerce (Amend-
ment) Promulgation 2009, was passed on 
29 January 2009, which basically provided 
legal rights for the Commerce Commission 
to ‘operate on a self-funding basis and for 
that purpose to charge fees in respect of the 
performance of its functions’. 
About three weeks later, on 16 March 
2009, the telecommunications price control 
order 2008 was revoked. The attorney-
general and the minister responsible for 
telecommunications ‘signed a notice revok-
ing the price control that was put in place 
last year after a report was received from the 
Commerce Commission’ (Fiji Government 
Online 2009:1). The attorney-general com-
mented that the ‘market itself will decide 
on the prices that are to be set within the 
market’. The stakeholders’ submissions 
on the review of the telecommunications 
pricing order were made between February 
and June 2009. Publicly available reports 
and those in the media provided mixed 
signals. While the government and Voda-
fone Fiji Limited11 publicly supported the 
move, based on pro-competitive economic 
principles, the Consumer Council of Fiji 
(2009) and the Fiji Daily Post (7 July 2009) 
had reservations.
Overall, the Fijian case shows evidence 
supporting the vulnerability of independ-
ent regulatory bodies to political influences. 
Further, there is evidence of the credibility 
of the telecommunications reform in Fiji 
being supported not by the independent 
regulator but by the deed of settlement: the 
Radisson accord.
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internationally, as shown by the reluctance 
to ‘headhunt’ top management officials of 
incumbents in markets opened later—Papua 
New Guinea, Tonga, Vanuatu and Fiji—after 
strong criticism in Samoa.
Third, the political will of all governments 
to intensify and speed up the liberalisation 
process could have led to the bypassing of 
some regulatory steps that could have been 
established before opening up the market. 
The regulation of the newly liberalised 
market in Vanuatu, based predominantly on 
the legal provisions of the deed of settlement 
and the licences granted to the operators, 
is a case in point. Another example is Fiji’s 
proposed telecommunications authority—
TAF—which was legalised as part of the 
Telecommunications Promulgation 2008, but 
has not yet been established.
Fourth, an issue closely connected with 
the political commitment by governments 
to liberalise markets quickly was the use 
of legal contractual agreements—deeds 
of settlement—identifying the rights and 
responsibilities of each stakeholder. The use 
of contractual agreements was effective in 
two ways. First, the terms and conditions, 
including compensation, for overriding the 
exclusivity of incumbent operators were 
outlined in the deeds, which legally bound all 
parties. Second, the responsibilities and legal 
functions of incumbent operators, competi-
tors, the regulator and other key regulatory 
principles on telecommunications such as 
competition policy, interconnection agree-
ments, numbering systems and spectrum 
management were outlined in the deed of 
settlement. The deed of settlement therefore 
provided a legal framework within which 
the sector could operate in the absence of 
legislation. Vanuatu is a case in point. Use 
of the deed might have been favoured by 
the stakeholders due to its industry-specific 
effects, the flexibility for all parties to negoti-
ate and, most importantly, less vulnerability 
to political debate prolonging the process.
Notes
1 See ’Ofa (2009:39–41) for a recent review of the 
debate over the effectiveness of independent 
regulators.
2 A deed of settlement is a legal document 
commonly used to record the agreement 
between the relevant parties (usually the 
government, incumbent operators and new 
entrants) over the ending of monopoly 
rights of the incumbent telecommunications 
operator. The deed of settlement usually 
sets out the legal principles and detailed 
guidelines on the new rules and legal 
responsibilities of each party in a competitive 
market.
3 Vanuatu liberalised its telecommunications 
sector by means of a strong legal contract 
between stakeholders  and without 
modern telecommunications legislation. 
A comprehensive telecommunications 
bill is, however, currently being drafted 
and discussed widely, which will mimic 
closely the terms and conditions of the legal 
contract.
4 A new Section 11 of the act replaced the 
original Section 11 in 2008. The amended 
Section 11 is discussed in the section on 
credibility problems.
5 With the remaining 10 per cent government 
owned by Communications Services Limited 
(CSL).
6 Dr John Philip Small, a consulting economist 
who was an expert witness for Digicel in the 
interconnection dispute, best captured the 
definition of interconnection by stating that 
‘[w]hen a SamoaTel customer calls a Digicel 
customer, both networks are used to provide 
the call service. In this case SamoaTel will 
charge its customer for the call, and pay some 
of that money to Digicel in consideration 
for its help in completing the call. The 
amount paid will be the interconnection rate’ 
(Supreme Court of Samoa 2008:2).
7 The basis for determining interconnection 
rates by the regulator is outlined in Section 
36(1) of the Telecommunications Act 2005, 
which prescribes that determination will be 
cost based.
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8 Any service provider whose gross revenue in a 
specific telecommunications market constitutes 
40 per cent or more of the total gross revenue 
of all service providers in that market is 
designated by the regulator as the dominant 
service provider (Legislative Assembly of 
Samoa 2005:s.26[1]).
9 Jointly owned by Cable & Wireless and France 
Telecom.
10 The Telecommunications Policy Statement 1998 
was the basis for the creation of Amalgamated 
Telecom Holdings (ATH) and the sale of 
ATH shares to Fiji National Provident Fund 
(FNPF) and private investors. The policy was 
also the basis for the Telecommunications 
Bill 2006 (now passed as Telecommunication 
Promulgation 2008).
11 Vodafone Fiji Limited was reported to have 
filed legal proceedings for judicial review of 
the price-control order (Vodafone Fiji Limited 
2009).
References
Baselala, E. n.d., ‘The Radisson deal’, 
Island Business. Available from 
http://www.islandsbusiness.com/
fiji_business/index_dynamic/co
ntainerNameToReplace=Middle
Middle/focusModuleID=17820/
overideSkinName=issueArticle-full.tpl 
(accessed 12 October 2009).
Consumer Council of Fiji, 2009. Submission 
to Commerce Commission: review 
of the telecommunications pricing 
determination, 26 February 2009, 
Consumer Council of Fiji, Suva. 
Available from http://consumersfiji.
org/Telecom_Review(1).pdf (accessed 12 
August 2009).
Court of Appeal, 2000. Cable & Wireless 
(Dominica) Limited versus Marpin Telecoms 
and Broadcasting Company Limited, Privy 
Council Appeal No. 15, Court of Appeal, 
Commonwealth of Dominica. Available 
from http://www.privy-council.org.uk/
files/other/CABLE~1%20RTF.rtf
Court of Appeal Fiji Islands, 2006. 
Vodafone Fiji Limited versus The Minister 
for Information, Communications and 
Media Relations, Civil Appeal No. 
ABU0014 of 2006S, Date of Judgment 
28 July 2006, Court of Appeal Fiji 
Islands, Suva.
Fiji Government Online, 2009. Price 
control revoked, Press release, 16 
March 2009, Fiji Government Online, 
Suva. Available from http://www.fiji.
gov.fj/publish/printer_14479.shtml 
(accessed 2 September 2009).
Fijilive, 2009. ‘Commerce Commission has 
new chair’, Fijilive Online, 27 February 
2009. Available from http://www.
fijilive.com/news/2009/02/27/14025.
Fijilive (accessed 17 August 2009).
Fiji Ministry of Information, 
Communications and Media Relations, 
2005. Address by Honourable Mrs 
Marieta M. Rigamoto, Workshop on 
Road Map for Telecommunication 
Sector Reform, 12 December, Southern 
Cross Hotel, Suva. 
Gay, D., 2005. ‘Vanuatu’s suspended 
accession bid: second thoughts?’, in P. 
Gallagher (ed.), Managing the Challenges 
of WTO Participation, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Grynberg, R. and Joy, R.M., 2000. 
‘The accession of Vanuatu to the 
WTO—lessons for the multilateral 
trading system’, Journal of World Trade, 
34(6):159–73. 
High Court of Fiji, 2005. Vodafone 
versus The Minister for Information, 
Communications and Media Relations, 
Civil Action No. HBC0576, Date of 
Decision 20 December 2005, Civil 
Jurisdiction, High Court of Fiji, Suva.
Legislative Assembly of Samoa, 2005. 
Telecommunications Act 2005, Legislative 
Assembly of Samoa, Apia. 
tElEcommunicationS rEform in fiji, Samoa and Vanuatu and thE crEdiBility ProBlEm
113
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 25 number 1 © 2010 the australian national university
——, 2009. Approved estimates of receipts 
and payments of the Government of Samoa 
for the financial year ending 30th June 
2009, Parliamentary Paper 2008/2009 
(2), Legislative Assembly of Samoa, 
Apia. 
Lesa, M.K., 2007. ‘A load of hogwash—MP 
attacks SamoaTel and Digicel’, Samoa 
Observer, 11 July 2007. 
’Ofa, S., 2008. ‘General agreement on trade 
in services (GATS) and WTO accession 
commitments—the experience of 
Tonga and Vanuatu’, in J. Streatfeild 
and S. Lacey (eds), New Reflections on 
International Trade: essays on agriculture, 
WTO accession and systemic issues, 
Cameron May, London. 
——, 2009. ‘The WTO’s 
telecommunications commitments and 
the credibility of telecommunications 
regulatory reforms in small island 
developing states’, Pacific Economic 
Bulletin, 24(3):39–57. 
Singh, M., 2008. ‘Lack of funds closes 
Commerce Commission’, Fiji Times 
Online, 28 September 2008. Available 
from http://www.fijitimes.com/story.
aspx?id=102043 (accessed 17 August 
2009).
——, 2009. ‘Conspiracy: Sweeney claims 
dismissal linked to inquiry’, Fiji Times 
Online, 3 March 2009. Available from 
http://www.fijitimes.com.fj/story.
aspx?id=115749 (accessed 17 August 
2009).
Supreme Court of the Republic of 
Vanuatu, 2006. Telecom Vanuatu Limited 
versus The Minister for Infrastructure 
and Public Utilities and Pacific Data 
Solutions Limited, Civil Case No. 205 of 
2005, Government of the Republic of 
Vanuatu, Port Vila. 
Supreme Court of Samoa, 2008. Digicel 
(Samoa) Ltd versus Attorney General 
[2008], WSSC 15 (30 March 2008), 
Supreme Court of Samoa, Apia. 
Vodafone Fiji Limited, 2009. Vodafone 
welcomes lifting of price control order, 
16 March, Vodafone Fiji Limited, 
Suva. Available from http://www2.
vodafone.com.fj/pages.cfm/general/
about-us/media-releases-1/media-
releases-09/march-16-1.html (accessed 
17 August 2009).
Acknowledgments
The author acknowledges the constructive 
comments from Peter Larmour on an earlier 
version of this article.
